Middle East Situation — 29 March 2000 Also…Comments on Taiwan election, Putin election & Gore’s VP List

The public believes that the peace process with Syria has failed, that Syria doesn’t want a deal and that the Israeli government is on the verge of collapse. Not so fast.

1. I was tempted to say that Assad pulled out because it became clear over the weekend that the Attorney General would be investigating Rabbi Yosef of Shas which would likely get Shas to withdraw from the coalition which was already issuing ultimatums to the government over the education ministry. Shas figured that Barak had to negotiate with Rabbi Yosef more than Assad because it held the swing votes and felt electorally strong. If Shas pulls out, so does Barak’s chance of passing a referendum. Why should Assad sign with Barak if Barak might not be around tomorrow? Also, several parties (ie: National Religious Party, Sharansky’s Russians) said they would withdraw as soon as there is a deal with Syria — any deal. Seems logical, right? Maybe not. Consider the following:

a. Assad is dealing with the US — Israel is incidental. Meaning that Assad is not going to decide things based on whether or not Barak will be around tomorrow — he is more interested in having the US guarantee. This is an important point of faith and is important when you look at the history of past negotiations; the Israeli internal political situation is a bit of a red herring. So it is true that Assad doesn’t care about having a peace with Israel — he does want a peace with America. This, it is hoped, will safeguard his kingdom for the next generation. By the way, if America is on board, so are the Israelis and Jordanians and this will also safeguard his son Bashar.

b. Shas miscalculated. The rabbi’s comments (demonizing the education minister) were so over the top that the majority of Israeli public opinion is very anti-Shas at this moment. Likud and Labor began serious talks about entering into a coalition and freezing out Shas; they can do this because Sharon and Barak agree on just about everything at this point: Pull out from Lebanon quickly (ie: now it will be May); Let the Palestinians declare statehood and continue the negotiations between two sovereign entities (so that the PA can be held more accountable for its actions and the talks will drag on forever — not necessarily bad for Israel or Arafat); and no more money for Shas. Shas is the biggest threat Likud has to its existence; as long as Shas keeps getting money, it can keep buying votes and the present trajectory is for Shas to get more votes and Likud less votes if an election were held 60 days from now (discounting the present furor in the country). The Golan was the only issue dividing them and if Syria doesn’t agree, then nothing divides them and Shas’s vote is not needed for anything and they can stay in the corner. If Assad and Israel do agree, then it is a different question but this is not the best time for Shas to threaten Barak with anything and it explains why Shas has reacted very quietly to the Attorney General’s investigation.

c. Assad miscalculated big time. He wants access to the Galilee and he may not be emotionally able to concede the point or, less likely, he may have tried to hold out or thought the offer would be better than he got, but anyway the gambit failed. Israeli intelligence thought he would agree to their offer to give them sovereignty over the area but make the borderline 100 meters off the lake. In other words, it’s yours but stay away from this buffer area and we’ll keep this secret so that nobody ever needs to know that the “real border” is 100 meters past the lake. Assad’s Honor is thus intact for public consumption. They leaked a similar story last week. It became clear by Saturday that Assad wasn’t going to agree to this. As far as I can tell, this is the best and final Israeli offer. It doesn’t make sense that they would both walk away for 100 meters unless either (a) Barak really cares about this for security or domestic political reasons, or (b) domestic unstable political considerations such as Shas and/or Bashar’s weak position made both parties decide that now is not the time to agree. Assuming this is the final Israeli offer, if Assad doesn’t agree, he makes it impossible for a weak son such as Bashar to later agree to the same terms. If the deal is a bad deal, Assad shouldn’t sign because Bashar would not be able to withstand domestic criticism. Bashar’s succession is by no means guaranteed. However, the deal offered is one that was crafted with the intention that Syria should have been able to agree to it ; it involved the trading of land (a popular alligator farm) to make up for the water and finesses the issues of the 1967 borders. 

In the end, Assad should sign because he gets the US on his side. He should climb down quickly in the next week or two or by May at the latest, otherwise it is clear that this matter will wait several years till it can be dealt with again. American and European reports to the contrary, Assad is heavily medicated and his attention span didn’t go past 20 minute intervals at the Geneva meetings — he is best not to push his luck procrastinating if he intends to make a deal in his lifetime. The Israelis can afford to wait as can Syria but both sides will benefit by dealing with it now, especially since the Israelis will leave Lebanon and will go after Syria if the Hizbullah don’t stop their attacks afterward. Make no mistake; Syria will be a target, and Lebanon and the rest of the world are not likely to be sympathetic to Syria who will be seen as an occupier. There are already articles in the Lebanese press voicing negative comments about the Lebanese occupation of Lebanon and I am told by leading Lebanese that Bashar will be under immense pressure to get out within a year of him taking over Syria and they fully expect him to withdraw.

d. Barak is in a strangely strong position right now. It was always known that NRP and Sharansky would pull out if the Golan deal was reached; that is not a scare. Tommy Lapid and others are quite ready to join the government. Barak still feels, with justification, that if he agrees to a deal and goes for a referendum, the population will not be able to resist voting in favor of the deal. [It will be explained to the public that to reject the deal is much riskier to life and limb. Withdrawal from Lebanon without Syria’s agreement on the Golan will lead in the short term to more Israeli lives lost. On the other hand, if there is no deal, the public will agree, because they want to leave Lebanon anyway, that lives lost fighting Syria will be the cost of longer-term change and the Israelis will be mentally prepared to pay the price because they and most Americans have become convinced that Assad cannot be dealt with in a rational manner after Barak has essentially offered him the store. This is the other big Assad mistake which must be reversed; he has managed to convince the Israelis and the world that he is not interested in peace.] There is no viable opposition in the Labor Party or in the Likud; there are young Turks in the Likud but none of them have a strong base or public persona. Netanyahu will be indicted and be tied up in court for a good year. Meridor is not interested in the top job; Mordechai is up on sexual harassment charges which appear credible, Olmert is too far to the right to attract centrist voters and has sleaze problems, and so the field is open to new faces such as Limor Livat, Micky Eitan and Silvan Shalom, depending on where the party is headed ideologically. In this light, if it is determined that the Syrian option is dead for now, Barak just might call Shas’s bluff and allow a no-confidence motion to pass, creating new elections for him and everyone else – a reshuffling of the deck that just might give him a better base from which to navigate domestically.

Conclusion: The situation is currently fluid and unstable; the Syrians, Israelis, Americans and others are negotiating intensively at this moment. We will have a better idea over the next 2 weeks how the Syrian track will turn out.

Other global thoughts: Concern from my colleague in Moscow that Putin will be an authoritarian and that civil liberties will be reduced over the next year based on what Putin has been doing for the past 6 months; insight from the Chinese that the PRC likes the new guy running Taiwan (they wanted him all along) and that Americans should consider that whatever military hardware is being shipped to Taiwan may ultimately wind up in China’s hands over the next 10 years as Taiwan moves closer to China; and the notion that Joe Lieberman, Senator from Connecticut, is on Gore’s short list for Vice President. They have been friends and political allies for years. Lieberman has high moral authority (made the first significant speech by a Democrat against Clinton’s actions from the floor of the Senate), has few if any enemies and happens to be an Orthodox Jew. He would raise the stature of the Gore ticket and I would enthusiastically support this. Pope’s visit to Holy Land was emotionally cathartic for all sides, personally inspirational and seemed to close a circle – seeing him walk across the room to the survivors at Yad Vashem, put a prayer into the Western Wall and being flanked by Barak and Weizman at the airport meant something. Strategic significance is hard to know -– the Pope doesn’t control the Vatican and the new pope might well reverse course. Meanwhile, the Vatican gets a better hearing for its concerns in Jerusalem and elsewhere. In the years ahead, deeds will count, such as the Vatican’s cooperation with Holocaust archives. They have many secrets to hide but remember it was the Vatican, the West and the Nazis against the emerging communist threat in Eastern Europe in the latter part of World War II. There were no angels on any side.

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